



Gathering Randomness for the Vernam System



The Cryptographic Use of Noise at Bell Labs


Charles Berret
Columbia University

SHOT Annual Meeting
October 27, 2017









The Bell System Technical Journal

Vol. XXVII

July, 1948

No. 3

A Mathematical Theory of Communication

By C. E. SHANNON

INTRODUCTION

THE recent development of various methods of modulation such as PCM and PPM which exchange bandwidth for signal-to-noise ratio has intensified the interest in a general theory of communication. A basis for such a theory is contained in the important papers of Nyquist¹ and Hartley² on this subject. In the present paper we will extend the theory to include a number of new factors, in particular the effect of noise in the channel, and the savings possible due to the statistical structure of the original message and due to the nature of the final destination of the information.

The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point. Frequently the messages have *meaning*; that is they refer to or are correlated according to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities. These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem. The significant aspect is that the actual message is one selected from a set of possible messages. The system must be designed to operate for each possible selection, not just the one which will actually be chosen since this is unknown at the time of design.

If the number of messages in the set is finite then this number or any monotonic function of this number can be regarded as a measure of the information produced when one message is chosen from the set, all choices being equally likely. As was pointed out by Hartley the most natural choice is the logarithmic function. Although this definition must be generalized considerably when we consider the influence of the statistics of the message and when we have a continuous range of messages, we will in all cases use an essentially logarithmic measure.

The logarithmic measure is more convenient for various reasons:

1. It is practically more useful. Parameters of engineering importance

¹ Nyquist, H., "Certain Factors Affecting Telegraph Speed," *Bell System Technical Journal*, April 1924, p. 324; "Certain Topics in Telegraph Transmission Theory," *A. I. E. E. Trans.*, v. 47, April 1928, p. 617.

² Hartley, R. V. L., "Transmission of Information," *Bell System Technical Journal*, July 1928, p. 535.

Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems*

By C. E. SHANNON

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

THE problems of cryptography and secrecy systems furnish an interesting application of communication theory.¹ In this paper a theory of secrecy systems is developed. The approach is on a theoretical level and is intended to complement the treatment found in standard works on cryptography.² There, a detailed study is made of the many standard types of codes and ciphers, and of the ways of breaking them. We will be more concerned with the general mathematical structure and properties of secrecy systems.

The treatment is limited in certain ways. First, there are three general types of secrecy system: (1) concealment systems, including such methods as invisible ink, concealing a message in an innocent text, or in a fake covering cryptogram, or other methods in which the existence of the message is concealed from the enemy; (2) privacy systems, for example speech inversion, in which special equipment is required to recover the message; (3) "true" secrecy systems where the meaning of the message is concealed by cipher, code, etc., although its existence is not hidden, and the enemy is assumed to have any special equipment necessary to intercept and record the transmitted signal. We consider only the third type—concealment systems are primarily a psychological problem, and privacy systems a technological one.

Secondly, the treatment is limited to the case of discrete information, where the message to be enciphered consists of a sequence of discrete symbols, each chosen from a finite set. These symbols may be letters in a language, words of a language, amplitude levels of a "quantized" speech or video signal, etc., but the main emphasis and thinking has been concerned with the case of letters.

The paper is divided into three parts. The main results will now be briefly summarized. The first part deals with the basic mathematical structure of secrecy systems. As in communication theory a language is considered to

* The material in this paper appeared originally in a confidential report "A Mathematical Theory of Cryptography" dated Sept. 1, 1945, which has now been declassified.

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
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
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
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
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


$$\frac{\text{OUTPUT}}{\text{INPUT}} = A_F = \frac{\mu}{1 - \mu\beta} = \frac{1}{-\beta} \left[1 - \frac{1}{1 - \mu\beta} \right]$$














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
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Secret Signaling System

209976
(2)




Fig. 1

Witnesses:
O'Rourke
Sh. P. Loni

Certified to be the drawing referred to in the specification hereto annexed.
NEW YORK, N.Y. U.S.A. DEC 16 1917

INVENTOR
G. S. Vernam

BY J. S. Roberts
ATTORNEY

Jan. 11, 1927.

G. S. VERNAM

1,613,686

METHOD OF AND APPARATUS FOR SECRET ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION OF PICTURES

Filed Dec. 5, 1924

2 Sheets-Sheet 1




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


Fig. 2

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